On a January night in 2019, Kinshasa held its breath. The electoral commission had just declared Félix Tshisekedi, the longtime opposition leader, the winner of the presidential poll — the first time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's history that power would pass peacefully from one elected president to another. But the celebration in the streets of the capital masked a constitutional puzzle: the man Tshisekedi succeeded, Joseph Kabila, still controlled the parliament.
The Split Verdict
The December 2018 election had produced a result that the 2006 Constitution's architects may not have fully anticipated. Tshisekedi's coalition, Cap pour le Changement (CACH), captured the presidency. Yet Kabila's Common Front for Congo (FCC) won a commanding majority in the 500-seat National Assembly. Under the semi-presidential system, the Prime Minister must come from the parliamentary majority. The President names the Prime Minister, but the choice is constrained by the arithmetic of the lower house.
For weeks, the two camps circled each other. Kabila, barred by term limits from running again, had handpicked his successor — Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary — only to watch him finish a distant third. Now the former president found himself in the unfamiliar role of kingmaker from the parliamentary benches. Tshisekedi, a veteran opposition figure who had spent years in the political wilderness, held the presidential palace but lacked the deputies to govern alone.
The Cohabitation Compact
In May 2019, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement. It was a political marriage of convenience, brokered behind closed doors, that would test whether the DRC's institutions could accommodate genuine rivalry. The deal gave the FCC the Prime Minister's post and a majority of ministerial portfolios. Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba, a Kabila loyalist and former railway executive, became Prime Minister. Tshisekedi retained the presidency, the defense and security portfolios, and a share of the cabinet.
The arrangement was unprecedented in Congolese history. For decades, the country had known only two modes: authoritarian monopoly under Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila, or war. The 2006 Constitution had been designed to prevent a return to either. Now its central tension — a directly elected president facing a parliament controlled by his predecessor — would play out in real time.
Two Governments in One
From the start, the Ilunga government functioned as two administrations operating in parallel. FCC ministers controlled the levers of the state apparatus: finance, interior, budget, mines. CACH ministers held secondary portfolios. The Prime Minister answered to the National Assembly, where the FCC held sway. The President chaired the Council of Ministers but often found his priorities stalled by a bureaucracy that took its cues from the parliamentary majority.
Disagreements erupted quickly. Judicial appointments became a flashpoint. Tshisekedi pushed for reforms to the Constitutional Court and the electoral commission (CENI), bodies he viewed as captured by the previous regime. The FCC bloc in parliament resisted, arguing that the President was overreaching. The Prime Minister, caught between his constitutional duty to the Assembly and his need to work with the President, became a mediator by default.
Security policy in the volatile east exposed another fault line. As Commander-in-Chief, Tshisekedi directed military operations against armed groups. But the Ministry of Defense, an FCC portfolio, controlled the budget and logistics. Field commanders reported receiving contradictory orders. Humanitarian workers in North Kivu noted that coordination between the presidency and the government had become a daily negotiation.
The Appointment Wars
The clearest battles were fought over patronage. The Constitution gives the President the power to appoint ambassadors, military officers, and senior civil servants — but on the Prime Minister's advice and after Council of Ministers deliberation. In practice, every vacancy became a negotiation. FCC allies expected their share of the diplomatic corps and the administration. CACH loyalists demanded their turn after 18 years in opposition.
By late 2019, the gridlock had paralyzed key institutions. The Constitutional Court, meant to have nine judges, operated with vacancies because the two sides could not agree on nominees. The High Council of the Judiciary, which manages judicial careers, stalled on promotions. Provincial governors — elected by provincial assemblies but invested by the President — sat in limbo in several of the 26 provinces.
The Fracture
The breaking point came in early 2020. Tshisekedi, frustrated by what he called "blocking" from the FCC, began courting individual deputies. The FCC's majority, built on a patchwork of dozens of small parties — some little more than "briefcase parties" centered on a single leader — proved less solid than it appeared. By March, enough deputies had signaled willingness to switch sides that Tshisekedi felt confident to act.
On March 31, 2020, the President addressed the nation. He announced the end of the coalition, citing "persistent divergences" and the need for a "coherent majority" to implement his program. The FCC cried foul, denouncing a constitutional coup. Their deputies boycotted parliamentary sessions. Ilunga tendered his resignation in late April, but the FCC-dominated Assembly initially refused to vote on a successor.
The standoff lasted weeks. Finally, in February 2021, the National Assembly invested a new Prime Minister: Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde, a former mining executive and Katanga governor who had defected from the FCC. The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN), a new coalition assembled around Tshisekedi, claimed a parliamentary majority. The FCC was relegated to opposition.
What the Episode Revealed
The 18-month cohabitation laid bare the fault lines in the DRC's political architecture. The 2006 Constitution's semi-presidential design assumes that the president and the parliamentary majority will usually align. When they do not, the system lacks a clear mechanism to resolve the impasse short of political realignment. The FCC-CACH experiment showed that realignment is possible — but it requires the disintegration of the very party system the Constitution sought to foster.
The episode also illuminated the transactional nature of Congolese coalitions. The FCC was not a unified party but an aggregation of dozens of formations, many of which existed primarily to access state resources. When the flow of appointments and budgets shifted toward the Sacred Union, the calculus for individual deputies changed overnight. Ideology played little role; survival did.
For Tshisekedi, the collapse of the coalition was a victory — but a costly one. He gained a compliant parliament and a Prime Minister of his choosing. Yet the precedent was set: a president could break a cohabitation by peeling off deputies, weakening the Assembly's role as a check on the executive. The Constitutional Court, still understaffed, watched silently.
In the villages of Kwilu and the neighborhoods of Lubumbashi, the daily business of governance — schools, clinics, roads — continued largely untouched by the maneuvers in Kinshasa. The provincial governors who were eventually invested, the judges who were eventually appointed, the budgets that were eventually passed — all arrived months late. The marriage of convenience had ended, but the bill for its dysfunction was still being paid.
This is one episode in a much longer story. For the full account of the 2018 Congolese election and its aftermath, read “Understanding how the Congolese Government Works” by Logan Bell on MixCache.com.
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