The $13 Million Bet on Computerized Tickets in 1967
In the lobby of a Los Angeles theater in 1967, a strange new machine hummed beside the box office. It looked like a typewriter married to a television set β a cathode-ray tube mounted on a desk, connected by thick cables to a computer the size of a refrigerator humming in a back room. A customer could tap a few keys, see a seating chart light up on the screen, pick a seat, and watch a ticket roll out of a printer. No queue, no paper ledger, no human error. It felt like science fiction. The company behind it, Computer Sciences Corporation, had bet $13 million that this was the future of entertainment.
The Vision
CSC was only eight years old but already the largest software company in America. Its founders, Roy Nutt and Fletcher Jones, had built their reputation writing compilers and assemblers for mainframe giants like IBM and Honeywell. They understood the power of code. But Fletcher Jones, the company's entrepreneurial engine, wanted more than service contracts. He wanted products β scalable software that could be sold again and again.
The idea for Computicket came from a simple observation: buying tickets was miserable. People queued for hours, box offices juggled paper charts, and promoters had no real-time view of inventory. A centralized computer connected to remote terminals could solve all of it. Theaters, stadiums, and concert halls would install terminals. A central mainframe would track every seat in real time. Customers could walk up, choose, pay, and leave with a ticket in seconds. Promoters would finally know exactly what was sold, where, and when.
It was a systems integration challenge of a kind CSC had mastered for NASA and the Department of Defense. The technical architecture was sound: a central Univac or IBM mainframe, phone-line connections to terminals, custom software for seat mapping and transaction processing. CSC poured engineers into the project, building not just the code but the hardware interfaces and the operational playbook for venues.
The Launch
By late 1967, Computicket was live in a handful of Southern California locations. The terminals worked. The seat maps updated instantly. The printers spat out clean, legible tickets. For the few hundred people who used it, the experience was startlingly modern β a glimpse of a frictionless future. CSC's sales teams fanned out, pitching the system to venue owners across the country. The promise was irresistible: higher sales, lower labor costs, real-time data, happy customers.
But the economics were brutal. Each terminal cost thousands to install and hundreds a month to maintain. The dedicated phone lines to the central computer added recurring charges. The mainframe itself β leased, not owned β consumed a fortune in processing time. CSC had to bear much of this upfront, betting that volume would drive costs down. It didn't.
The Wall
The problem wasn't the technology. It was the world around it. In 1967, most Americans had never touched a computer. The idea of "buying tickets from a machine" felt cold, confusing, even suspicious. Box office staff, fearing replacement, resisted. Managers hesitated to retrain staff and remodel lobbies. And the phone network β the nervous system of the whole operation β was unreliable enough that a single line failure could paralyze a venue's sales for hours.
Worse, the volume never materialized. Even at peak times, a theater might sell a few hundred tickets a night. The fixed cost of the terminal and line amortized over that volume made each ticket computationally expensive. CSC tried subsidies, pilot programs, revenue-sharing models. Nothing closed the gap. The $13 million loss β a staggering sum for a company whose total revenue had only recently passed $50 million β mounted steadily.
The Reckoning
By 1970, the board had seen enough. Computicket was shut down. The terminals were pulled. The mainframe cycles were redirected. The $13 million was written off β a wound deep enough that, combined with the sudden death of Fletcher Jones in a plane crash two years later, it forced a strategic retreat. CSC's new CEO, William Hoover, pivoted the company hard toward government contracts and custom development, the steady work that paid the bills.
Yet the failure carried a strange afterlife. Engineers who had built Computicket's seat-mapping logic later adapted it for airline reservation systems. The terminal-to-mainframe communication protocols informed CSC's later network management work for the U.S. Customs Service and the FAA. The very idea of real-time inventory, once a money-losing experiment, became the backbone of modern commerce.
Today, when a fan taps a phone screen and watches a QR code appear for a concert that night, they are using the great-grandchild of that humming box in the 1967 lobby. CSC had the vision, the code, and the nerve. They just arrived thirty years before the world caught up.
This is one episode in a much longer story. For the full account of the history of Computer Sciences Corporation, read “Computer Sciences Corp.” by Jason Diaz on MixCache.com.
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