About this book:

"Gaullists and Europe" explores how France, particularly under Charles de Gaulle, navigated the complex relationship between national independence and European integration from the end of World War II through the 1970s. The book argues that Gaullist leaders viewed European institutions not as a constraint on sovereignty but as a "multiplier of French agency," enabling France to shape rules, secure advantages, and project influence. This strategy involved a distinctive blend of diplomatic maneuvering, state-led economic planning (dirigisme), and strategic institutional design within the Cold War geopolitical context.

The narrative traces France's postwar recovery, emphasizing the critical role of the Monnet Plan and state control over key industries in rebuilding national capacity. This strong economic foundation allowed France to enter European negotiations from a position of strength. The book highlights the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as France's initial success in binding Germany while securing vital resources. However, the subsequent failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) underscored French reluctance to cede sovereignty in sensitive areas like defense, foreshadowing de Gaulle’s later actions.

Under de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, the "Europe of Nations" doctrine took center stage, advocating for intergovernmental cooperation over supranational federalism. This vision led to seminal events such as the construction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—a crucial payoff for French farmers—the Franco-German Élysée Treaty, and the infamous vetoes of British entry, all designed to cement a French-led continental bloc. De Gaulle further asserted French independence by developing the *force de frappe* and withdrawing from NATO's integrated command, while simultaneously pursuing an independent détente with the East. The book also details how France skillfully wielded its administrative state and technocratic elite, particularly through the Permanent Representation in Brussels, to influence rule-making, employ package deals, and manage institutional challenges from the European Court of Justice and Parliament.

The narrative extends beyond de Gaulle’s tenure, examining Georges Pompidou’s more pragmatic recalibration, including Britain's accession, and the Community's adaptation to the social upheaval of May 1968 and the economic shocks of the 1970s. These crises propelled France and Germany, under Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, towards deeper economic governance, culminating in the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS). Ultimately, the book reveals how Gaullist France strategically engaged with Europe, leveraging its internal strengths and diplomatic acumen to secure its national interests and assert leadership, leaving an enduring legacy for the European Union's structure and operational style.

What You'll Find Inside:

• France's Gaullists transformed the sovereignty-integration paradox into a grand strategy, using European institutions as a multiplier of French agency rather than viewing them as opposites to national independence.
• French postwar dirigisme and planning apparatus (like the Monnet Plan) served as negotiating tools at Brussels, providing credible commitments and sectoral priorities for European engagement.
• France leveraged agenda-setting power in the Council, exploited the Common Agricultural Policy's strategic value, and calibrated relations with the Commission and Court to convert institutional rules into resources for national advantage.
• Cold War geopolitics created both constraints and opportunities, with Gaullist doctrine (including nuclear independence and NATO withdrawal) seeking maneuver room that could be traded for influence within European structures.
• Disciplined linkage of agricultural financing to market-building, industrial modernization to tariff schedules, and monetary choices to institutional reforms allowed France to secure concessions while entrenching mutual dependence that anchored the Community.

Who's It For:

This book is ideal for scholars and students of European Union history, French foreign policy, and Cold War diplomacy. It will particularly benefit researchers interested in statecraft and institutional design, as it examines how a mid-sized power like France used economic planning, coalition-building, and institutional entrepreneurship to punch above its weight in European affairs. Professionals working in EU institutions, international relations, or comparative politics will find valuable insights into how sovereignty and integration can coexist through strategic statecraft.