

# News Wars: Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity in Europe

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## Introduction

Elections are moments when democracies tell the truth about themselves. They are

also moments when adversaries—foreign and domestic—work hardest to bend that truth. Across Europe, information operations exploit social divisions, weaken trust in media and institutions, and attempt to shape outcomes at precisely the times when citizens need clarity most. This book is a practical, investigative account of how those operations work, why they succeed, and how journalists, regulators, platforms, and election officials can counter them without compromising democratic values.

The pages that follow map the sources, networks, and tactical playbooks that drive contemporary disinformation. Rather than treating manipulation as a single problem with a single fix, we examine layered systems: from opportunistic grifters seeking clicks and ad revenue, to coordinated political actors, to state-linked operations that blend espionage with public influence. We look at how narratives are seeded, how fringe claims are laundered into mainstream discourse, and how amplification engines—recommendation algorithms, influencer networks, ads, and messaging apps—turn sparks into wildfires.

Our approach is deliberately hands-on. We present verification methodologies that reporters and analysts can apply immediately: open-source intelligence techniques, forensic media checks for images, audio, and video, and network mapping to uncover coordinated inauthentic behavior. Readers will learn how to trace claims back to original sources, recognize manipulation cues, and document evidence in ways that stand up to editorial scrutiny and, when necessary, legal challenge. These methods are paired with field-tested workflows that help newsrooms and election teams move quickly without sacrificing accuracy.

Because information operations do not respect borders, we place European elections within a cross-border context. Language communities, diaspora media, and transnational platforms allow narratives to leap jurisdictions in minutes. We explore how disinformation adapts to local histories and cultural identities, and why minority and multilingual audiences often face tailored manipulation. Case studies illustrate how “hack-and-leak” campaigns, synthetic personas, deepfakes, and micro-targeted ads converge around critical moments in the election calendar—from candidate registration and early voting to debate nights and result announcements.

Defense requires more than detection. We assess platform policies and enforcement practices, highlighting gaps that adversaries exploit and documenting evasive techniques that evolve in response. We examine the regulatory landscape—including the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, data protection frameworks, and relevant member-state laws—to clarify where accountability mechanisms exist, when they are effective, and how they can be abused. Regulatory tools can reduce systemic risk, but they must be paired with institutional capacity, independent oversight, and robust civil-society engagement.

Resilience is the throughline of this book. For media outlets, that means editorial

protocols for suspected manipulation, transparent corrections, and audience engagement that builds trust before a crisis hits. For election authorities, it means risk assessment, clear communication channels, scenario planning, and “prebunking” campaigns that inoculate the public against predictable falsehoods. We offer templates for rapid response, checklists for cross-functional coordination, and metrics to evaluate whether interventions are working.

Finally, we look ahead. Artificial intelligence accelerates both offense and defense: models can fabricate persuasive content at scale, but they can also help detect coordination, authenticate media, and forecast where manipulation is likely to strike next. Europe’s democratic health will depend on whether institutions, platforms, and the public can adapt as quickly as adversaries do. This book equips practitioners with the tools to meet that challenge: to identify threats early, respond with precision, and strengthen the informational commons on which free and fair elections depend.

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## **CHAPTER ONE: Mapping Europe’s Information Battlefield**

Europe, a continent of ancient borders and modern democracies, finds itself increasingly contested not by armies, but by algorithms and narratives. The battlefield isn't always visible; it’s often a subtle contest for attention and belief, waged across social feeds, encrypted chats, and niche news sites. Understanding this landscape requires moving beyond simplistic notions of “fake news” and instead mapping the complex ecosystems where information, and misinformation, flourish and intertwine. This chapter will lay the groundwork, identifying the key features of Europe's diverse media environments and pinpointing the vulnerabilities that adversaries exploit.

The European information space is a mosaic of languages, cultures, and historical experiences. Unlike the more homogeneous media landscapes found in some other parts of the world, Europe’s linguistic diversity alone presents a formidable challenge. Every language acts as a potential vector for tailored narratives, often insulated from scrutiny by a broader public or international fact-checking efforts. A disinformation campaign targeting Slovakian speakers might be entirely invisible to a French journalist, even if both reside within the same regulatory framework. This fragmentation creates fertile ground for localized influence operations that can fly under the radar of pan-European analysis.

Consider, for instance, the varying levels of trust in traditional media across the continent. In some Northern European countries, public service broadcasters and established newspapers still command relatively high levels of public confidence.

Citizens there might be more inclined to dismiss sensational or unsubstantiated claims. Conversely, in parts of Southern and Eastern Europe, historical experiences with state-controlled media or pervasive political partisanship have eroded faith in mainstream outlets. Here, alternative news sources, often highly biased or outright fabricated, can gain traction more easily, tapping into existing cynicism and grievances. This pre-existing trust deficit acts like a weakened immune system, making populations more susceptible to the next viral falsehood.

The political spectrum itself contributes to the complexity. Europe is home to a robust array of political ideologies, from centrist consensus to the far-left and far-right fringes. Each segment of this spectrum often has its own preferred media outlets, its own echo chambers, and its own narrative vulnerabilities. A story designed to inflame anti-immigrant sentiment, for example, might find immediate resonance within certain nationalist online communities, regardless of its factual basis. Conversely, a narrative critical of established institutions might find a receptive audience among anti-establishment groups. The battle, therefore, is not just for a universal "truth," but for the perceived truth within these ideologically siloed communities.

Technological adoption rates and digital literacy levels also carve out distinct features on this information map. While broadband penetration is generally high across the EU, significant disparities exist in how citizens engage with digital platforms and critically assess online content. Older demographics, for example, might be less adept at identifying manipulated images or distinguishing between legitimate news sites and propaganda outlets. Younger generations, while digitally native, are not immune; they often consume news through social media feeds curated by algorithms that prioritize engagement over accuracy, making them susceptible to emotionally charged or polarizing content. These varying levels of media literacy mean that a single disinformation campaign might require different tactics to succeed in different national or demographic contexts.

Moreover, the shadow of historical grievances and geopolitical tensions looms large over Europe's information space. Memories of past conflicts, occupations, and ideological divisions are easily weaponized. Narratives that exploit these historical wounds can be incredibly potent, even if factually dubious. For example, disinformation campaigns targeting the Baltic states or Poland often play on anxieties related to Russia, echoing Soviet-era propaganda or attempting to rewrite historical events. Similarly, narratives around migration can tap into historical fears of cultural dilution or economic strain, regardless of current realities. These deep-seated emotional triggers are a goldmine for information manipulators.

The legal and regulatory frameworks, while increasingly harmonized at the EU level, still present a patchwork of approaches at the national level. The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) represent significant steps towards a more unified approach to platform accountability, but national laws on defamation, hate

speech, and media ownership continue to vary. This regulatory labyrinth can create opportunities for actors to exploit jurisdictional loopholes, launching campaigns from countries with more permissive speech laws or less robust enforcement mechanisms. The cross-border nature of information flow often outpaces the ability of national legal systems to respond effectively.

Economic factors also shape the battlefield. The decline of traditional advertising revenues has hit many European news organizations hard, particularly at the local level. This has led to news deserts—areas where independent, professional journalism has diminished or disappeared entirely. These voids are quickly filled by alternative sources, some legitimate, many not. Without reliable local news to hold power to account and provide factual information, communities become more vulnerable to rumors, local political manipulation, and the narratives pushed by well-funded external actors. The economics of attention, where clicks and engagement drive revenue, further incentivizes sensationalism and polarizing content, even from otherwise legitimate sources.

The sheer volume of content produced daily further complicates matters. The "firehose of falsehood" approach, where adversaries flood the information environment with so much conflicting and contradictory information that the public becomes overwhelmed and disengaged, is a common tactic. It's not just about convincing people of a lie, but about fostering a general sense of confusion and distrust in *any* information source. When citizens can no longer discern truth from fiction, they may disengage from the democratic process entirely, which is often the ultimate goal of those seeking to destabilize democracies.

Finally, the increasing sophistication of information operations means that the battlefield is constantly evolving. What began with simple fabrication and amplification has progressed to include deepfakes, synthetic media, and AI-generated content that blurs the lines between reality and simulation. The cat-and-mouse game between those who spread disinformation and those who try to counter it is relentless. As new technologies emerge, so do new vulnerabilities and new tactical playbooks. Remaining effective in this environment requires continuous learning, adaptation, and a deep understanding of the diverse and dynamic European information landscape. This chapter, therefore, serves as the essential primer for navigating the complexities we will explore in the subsequent pages.

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